OK - so I promised a series on this book and so here is the first. I have to say that as I read it, I am not learning as much as I wanted and then found this review by Rhys Williams from 2001 and probably now understand why...but it's a start...
I have to say that Peter Berger is a name I was aware of - when the book was written he was Professor and Director of the Institute for the Study of Economic Culture at Boston Uni (now Culture, Religion and World Affairs [cura]. He even has his own wikipedia entry. So I suppose all that kudos allows you to write an article which provides no background evidence for all the affirmations you make in the article. This first chapter sets the scene for the whole book and its comments are repeated throughout the rest of the articles and I can even recognise some of the material in both God is Back and in David Lehmann's arguments in the seminar. So this is a pretty influential chapter - probably a distillation of work Peter has done elsewhere.
Berger points out that from a global historical perspective the anomaly is not religion or religious institutions but rather non-religious institutions. In other words, the University of Chicago (his example) is the anomaly not Iranian mullahs. He's got a good point. When we look at the secularization agenda (as any other agenda), we need to recognise the perspective we are imposing. I caught up tonight with the show on UK TV over the Easter Weekend about the possible persecution of British Christians in the UK. From a global historical perspective there is no such thing. But from a contemporary and contextual perspective, the drive towards liberal secular rights within UK culture would seem to be making our institutions less tolerant towards religion. Berger would point out how anomalous this would be both in an historical perspective but also in a contemporary global perspective. I was surprised in the TV programme to see the number of non-Christians advocating a case for Christian expression in the UK.
Berger traces back the secularization theory to the Enlightenment and the simplistic argument that 'modernization necessarily leads to a decline in religion, both in society and in the minds of individuals'. In other words, advance was towards a secular society. However, Berger makes it clear how wrong this assertion is. Cultural secularism does not mean the same as or necessarily lead to individual secularism. And cultural secularism seems to produce robust processes of counter-secularism as well. The main responses to the Enlightenment secularization project were either rejection or adaptation. Rejection was in the form of religious revolution (pan-cultural like Iran, or sub-cultural like the Amish or Mormons or, to take a contemporary UK example not used by Berger, the indigenous African churches popping up all over London). Adaptation was in the form of those institutions which adopted modernism including the predominance of reason and rational thought - a kind of secularized religion - perhaps exampled in liberal Christianity or in Methodism or something similar - a faith where key aspects of modernity are accepted and fused into the DNA of the institution. You can play the 'spot the secularization' game with just about any denomination or movement including pentecostalism.
Berger argues strongly that the secularization project along with any rejection and adaptation of it have failed. He suggests that the proof of this is in the abject failure of rejection (who can create a religious ghetto in the world of mass communication and transcultural media? Ask the Amish!) and adaptation (see the figures for the major modern denominations across the Western so-called secularised world. So, Berger maps Roman Catholic responses - first through rejection (flouting Enlightenment ideals by promulgating Papal Infallibility and the Immaculate Conception) and then by adaptation - the aggiornamento of Vatican II. Of course, this oscillation between rejection (Aids, contraception, equality) and adaptation (acceptance of historical criticism, reform of the curia) has continued on through the times of John Paul II and Benedict XVI and helps to explain Benedict's response to contemporary rights based equality.
Berger then cites lots of examples of how religion is making a come back through conservative, orthodox, traditionalist movements - like Pentecostalism in Latin America, Orthodox Judaism in Israel, Orthodox Church in Russia, as well as similarly traditional movements within Islam, Hinduism and Buddhism among others. Berger argues that all of these movements either undermine the modernism=secularism link or at least create a new link: modernism = secularism+counter-secularism. Religion simply will not play ball with the Enlightenment.
Of course, none of these movements are monolithic. Within Islam, revival movements include both ultra-conservative Saudi-based Wahhabism and the pro-democracy, pro-pluralist Nudhat'ul-Ulama movement in Indonesia. Similar alternatives appear across the world. There may be family traits across what some commentators persist in calling 'fundamentalist' revival movements across different countries and religions, but the one key factor seems to be that religion matters to these people - and it matters more to them than assent to liberal dogma.
Berger lists two exceptions which may well be linked - Western Europe and the urban elite. Western Europe was not experiencing the same kind of religious backlash that the rest of the world knew and understood at the turn of the millenium. It may be that that has now changed. But even if it has, Europe is much more secular than most of the world - even than North America which would seem to be more modernized but less secular despite the much more radical separation of church and state which is enshrined in the law there.
Secondly, Berger points to the common urban educated global elite (UEGE) who tend to act as power-brokers and intermediaries between societies. This elite is in the main strongly secularized and 'acts as the principle carrier of progressive, Enlightened beliefs and values'. Moreover, it is an isolated often self-perpetuating elite which controls elite education, government, media and legal institutions. Since that elite mimics European values and the European academy (even in Euro-based cultures like North America and Australasia which have adapted basically the same systems and institutions), then it acts as a carrier for the most secularized form of civilisation. Moreover, as the main resource pool for diplomats, it provides a particularly de-contextualised resource pool. In other words, countries end up speaking to one another in secular terms which their citizens do not recognise. It is the voice of the secular elite rather than voice of the religious people.
Berger draws two conclusions from this. First that the source of the current upsurge in religion is due to either counter-secularism or counter-elite activities. In other words, secularism still sets the agenda. But second, he also refers back to his argument that it is the university which is more odd than religious expression. We have always had strongly felt religious expression - why would we want to regard it as odd - or more odd than liberal European secularism which is a much less common phenomenon within human society. Get your perspective right - in historic, global and contemporary terms.
It's a fascinating and deeply influential article - but non-referenced! You can read part of it here if you want to get a flavour of it.
Next, we'll pick up one aspect of this in George Wiegel's piece on John Paul II.
Recent Comments